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The view that fluctuations of economic activity can be attributed
to real (or technology) shocks has received widespread attention
in recent years. According to the real business cycle theory,
output movements are not induced by monetary policy. This propo-
sition is supported by several empirical investigations using two
different types of tests: Firstly, macroeconomic time series can
be characterized as following a random walk; secondly, in the
analysis of vector autoregressions, the money supply does not
cause output. In this paper, both tests are applied for data of
the West German economy.
The hypothesis that macroeconomic time series behave like a ran-
dom walk cannot be rejected with great power. Most of the 17
series under investigation show a unit coefficient if regressions
for a variable are run on its own past value. Nevertheless, some
of the statistical results, in particular the presence of auto-
correlation, give rise to doubts about the correctness of the
models. Above all, it is well known that such tests cannot con-
clusively discriminate between a value of 1.00 and, say, 0.96 for
the coefficient, although the differences are substantial for the
decomposition of a series into permanent and transitory compo-
nents .
In the tests for Granger-causality, the importance of several
candidates for explaining output is investigated. It turns out
that in the bivariate case, real domestic expenditures are caused
by the real money supply, real interest rates and the terms of
trade, respectively. If systems with three variables are consi-
dered, the influence of the money supply dominates; neither in-
terest rates nor terms of trade improve forecasts of domestic
expenditures based on the knowledge of the money supply.
These latter results, while contradicting propositions of real
business cycle theory, are in accordance with several other stu-
dies on the West German economy which show a strong impact of
monetary policy on economic activity. In the final section, we
therefore mention some doubts about the appropriateness of re-
lying exclusively on real factors when explaining output fluc-
tuations. Money seems to be non-neutral in the short run, and,
furthermore, we have some evidence that money is not neutral even
in the long run.ON REAL AND MONETARY EXPLANATIONS OF BUSINESS CYCLES IN WEST
GERMANY
I. Introduction
The past decade has seen a serious challenge to business cycle
theory. It affected all conventional views, whether Keynesian or
new classical, because the definition of the business cycle it-
self and the alleged size of the effects of macroeconomic policy,
in particular monetary policy, on economic activity were questio-
ned. According to the new real business cycle theory, the size
and the persistence of cycles is much smaller than commonly
thought and therefore much less of a problem for welfare and thus
economic policy.
The new view was put forward by two distinct strands in the lite-
rature. Firstly, it could be shown that a well-articulated neo-
classical model in which money has no role can mimic actual fluc-
tuations of economic activity reasonably well ; in that model,
movements in real GNP and other variables are due to shocks in
technology which have permanent effects. Secondly, it was claimed
by economists analyzing economic time series that the behavior of
those variables commonly associated with business cycles (GNP,
employment, investment and so on) can be characterized by a ran-
dom walk; this hypothesis, too, implies that the largest part of
economic fluctuations can be attributed to real shocks which
have, by definition, persistent effects on the level of activi-
ty . Thus, proponents of this view deny any major role for mone-
tary policy in explaining movements of output,
See, e.g., Kydland, Prescott (1982) and the discussion in
Lucas (1987) , who does not subscribe to this line of real
business cycle proponents but uses this model as a benchmark
and tries to incorporate money into it.
Major impacts came from Nelson, Plosser (1982) whose article
on macroeconomic time series of the United States was fol-
lowed by many other investigations, also for other coun-
tries.- 2 -
and the Phillips-curve in all its interpretations, i.e., inclu-
ding the expectations-augmented version or the Lucas supply cur-
ve, is regarded as an artifact. A further empirical challenge to
the theory of monetary business cycles came from a somewhat dif-
ferent angle , namely the empirical work resting on vector auto-
2
regressions . On the basis of their findings, several authors
rejected the view that money has any significant impact on output
movements. It is this characteristic of the real business cycle
theory that distinguishes it from the alternatives (McCallum,
1986, p. 398).
The influence of this new view has been substantial for it offers
a theory based on strict neoclassical principles at a time when
the attractiveness of the leading alternative of this school -
the Barro-Lucas theory of monetary business cycles - seems to
weaken. It induced a tremendous amount of research on a better
specification of the role of monetary policy in a neoclassical
model. Lucas discusses progress along this line, but states that
an integration of monetary elements into the Kydland-Prescott
model "... is, at present, slightly beyond the frontier of what
is technically possible" (Lucas, 1987, p. 85).
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relevance and some of
the propositions of the real business cycle theory in the con-
text of the West German economy. This approach seems to be, at
least in part, appropriate for the explanation of economic acti-
vity in the 1970's. This was the period in which real disturban-
Different in the sense that not all of those economists are
proponents of the neoclassical real business cycle theory.
Notably Sims (1980) .
As the reader will have noticed, the term "real business
cycle theory" is somewhat misleading since proponents of
this school define the business cycle quite differently from
the common use of the term. Actually, it is a theory to
explain economic fluctuations, i.e., growth plus cycle. For
a discussion, see also Section II. Nevertheless, we will
continue to use the label to make things easier.- 3 -
ces of great magnitude hit the economy; hardly any observer would
deny that the oil price hikes, and possibly also the large chan-
ges of real exchange rates as well as the changes in fiscal poli-
cy, had an impact on the movement of output and employment. Fur-
thermore, the development of average output growth since World
War II shows a marked downturn over time , and several of the
shifts in the growth rate seem to coincide with real shocks, in
particular, again, in the middle and late 1970's, but probably
also in the earlier periods. And the acceleration of economic
activity in 1987/88 can possibly be viewed, in part, as a respon-
se to the favorable development of import prices. Nevertheless,
it may be difficult to distinguish all the mentioned effects from
the effects stemming from monetary policy. As a casual observati-
on, it seems that favorable supply shocks coincided with (or led
to) more monetary expansion, and, equivalently, real shocks with
negative consequences were accompanied by monetary restrictions.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the main argu-
ments of the real business cycle view are summarized and con-
trasted with some criticisms. We will then present tests on the
validity of some propositions and look at the stochastic behavior
(random walk) of several economic time series in West Germany
(Section III). The second approach of vector autoregressions will
also be applied to West German data; we will test for Granger-
causality (Section IV) . We will then take a closer look at the
business cycles in the 1970's (Section V). Finally, we will dis-
cuss the possible limits of the empirical investigations in gene-
ral and elaborate a bit more on the notion of the neutrality of
money.
On average, real GNP increased by some eight percent in the
1950's, five percent in the 1960's, three percent in the
1970
?s and less than two percent in the 1980's.- 4 -
II. On the Relevance of Real Business Cycle Theory
The arguments in favor of the real business cycle view are theo-
retical and empirical. The implication is that money is practi-
cally irrelevant; monetary policy can only produce some noise but
not any kind of a Phillips-curve. This applies also, and this is
a crucial difference between this theory and the new classical
models, to monetary surprises; even unexpected money is neutral.
This result turns out in some studies when the time series of,
e.g., output can be characterized as random walks.
1. What Is a Trend?
The way economic time series are described is therefore crucial
when the force of real business cycle theory is assessed. Charac-
teristically, most macroeconomic time series are not stationary
but increase over time. The conventional procedure to define
business cycles is to assume a deterministic time trend for vari-
ables such as real GNP; usually, this trend is taken to be linear
or quadratic. The fluctuations around this trend are then, by
definition, business cycles. These cycles are persistent, avera-
ging, say, some five to seven years, and show quite large devia-
tions from trend resulting in pronounced overheating or high
unemployment. All conventional theories, then, set out to explain
these movements, while normally the behavior of the trend is left
for another "department" to explain - growth theory. But is this
distinction appropriate when economic fluctuations are to be
explained?
Proponents of real business cycle theory state that the assumpti-
2
on of a deterministic trend is ad hoc. This is certainly cor-
A recent contribution is Wasserfalien (1988). Earlier stu-
dies are Wasserfallen (1985) and Stulz, Wasserfallen (1985).
This may also be a moving average or a trend derived from
the peaks in business cycles.- 5 -
rect. Early theories and methodological studies go through great
lengths to make a judgement on the trend , but there is no preci-
se knowledge on the underlying growth rate of the economy and how
it changes over time. This applies also to calculations of poten-
tial output. As the past has shown, these estimates had to be
revised again and again, they show sudden shifts and so on. The
difficulty lies in the fact that those factors that determine the
underlying rate of growth are difficult to measure, e.g., the
stock of technology. What is the alternative? Of course, we can
always think of a way to decompose GNP into a trend and a cycli-
cal component. But there is no satisfactory and widely accepted
definition how this should be done, so "... one economist's
'trend
1 can be another's 'cycle'" (Stock, Watson, 1988, p. 150).
One way to proceed - and this is what is done in the works on
real business cycle theory - is to look at the time series them-
selves. Here, the difference is made between two models that
define the trend and deviations from it. The first describes the
variable y. (e.g., the log of GNP) as a series that, on average,
2 is influenced by the time trend . It is therefore characterized
See, for example, Mitchell (1928), who discusses various
problems: "Unless it is possible to find trends which are
satisfactory throughout long periods - long in comparison
with business cycles - the distinction between secular and
cyclical fluctuations is blurred and the whole analysis
loses its point" (p. 214). And: "Is there a definite rela-
tion between secular trends and cyclical fluctuations? ...
Can the trends of time series, after they have been measu-
red, be discarded as of no further interest? Or must the
trends themselves be brought into the explanations of cyc-
lical fluctuations ...?" (p. 233). - Haberler (1937) is less
explicit in the discussion of the "secular trend" but he
also stresses the difficulty of defining a trend: "... it is
by no means necessary that the secular change should take
place at a constant rate, or that it should always slope
upward along a smooth curve which can confidently be extra-
polated into the future. Nor is it excluded that the forces
which create the trend may tend to operate spasmodically or
cyclically " (p. 174) .
We use the simplest version of such a trend. Also, we ne-
glect other aspects, e.g., seasonal factors.- 6 -
as belonging to the trend-stationary class (TS):
(1) yt = a + 6t + ufc
Here, the disturbance term is stationary with zero mean and vari-
2
ance a^ but is serially autocorrelated (with a positive sign).
This means that for short-term forecasts of y, the existing auto-
correlation can be exploited. Even for the distant future, there
is only limited uncertainty concerning values of y. Apart from
the disturbance term, the prediction can be very precise because
the series y will always return to the trend.
This, however, is not true for the alternative, difference-static
onary class (DS) :
(2) yt = |i + yt1 + vt
In this case, y, depends on the realized value of the previous
period, with the coefficient being equal to one. If this model of
a random walk with drift - the coefficient u represents the ave-
rage increase of y over time - is correct, future values cannot
be predicted with precision. Firstly, the disturbance term is not
autocorrelated and can thus not be exploited (i.e., v is white
noise). Such a model is commonly used to describe the behavior of
prices on financial markets (stock prices, interest rates, ex-
change rates) and implies that no information is available to
improve the forecast for the next period - i.e., the best fore-
2
cast is that today's price will also be tomorrow's price . Se-
condly, the forecast variance increases "without bound" because
the deviations from trend are not stationary as in the TS-case
but the series is an accumulation of stationary changes, and this
sum is not stationary.
Difference-stationary means that, in this case, the first
difference has to be used to achieve stationarity.
Possibly, as in this example, the drift term has to be con-
sidered.- 7 -
One might argue that these statistical procedures do not in any
way resemble economic theory and are therefore beside the point.
What is there for the economist to explain if he knows that out-
put follows a random walk? The answer is that these statistical
methods help to determine what exactly is to be analyzed by the
economist., And the implications of the correct choice of the
method can be very important. If the true model is indeed of the
DS-:class - i.e., the series has to be differenced to be stationa-
ry - estimates with the other model can lead to spurious results.
This was demonstrated for the relationship between the money
supply and nominal income . The quantity theory suggests a rela-
tionship with a coefficient of one. If an equation with just the
trend variable is estimated, the coefficient may be significantly
different from one. However, this equation is misspecified as is
indicated by the presence of autocorrelation (as indicated by,
e.g., a low Durbin-Watson statistic); the estimate for the coef-
ficient is therefore biased. If first differences are used, this
autocorrelation disappears and the coefficient becomes one. Such
problems can, therefore, arise when the true model is indeed DS
but the econometrician estimates a different model, e.g., one of
the TS-class. Another important example concerns Friedman's per-
manent income hypothesis, according to which people consume ex-
actly the permanent component of their disposable income; this
part, however, follows a random walk. Therefore, observed con-
sumption will also be a random walk. This implies for the testing
procedure that current consumption cannot satisfactorily be ex-
2
plained by current observed income .
See Plosser, Schwert (1978) .
o
On this distinction, see also the example in Stock, Watson
(1988, p. 160 ff.), where one econometrician makes all the
mistakes, because he_ does not distinguish correctly between
levels and differences, whereas the second econometrician
gets the correct results because she handles the time se-
ries, which are truly (i.e., by assumption of the authors
providing the data) random walks, properly in her regres-
sions.- 8 -
2. Can Business Cycles Be Random?
What does this analysis mean for business cycle analysis? In
effect, the question of TS- and DS-models amounts to asking: If
the current level of, e.g., real GNP is one percent higher than
expected, how does this affect our forecast of the future level
of GNP? The answer given by someone using a TS-model would be:
not at all. Since GNP is, by assumption, trend returning, the
deviation from trend is only transitory; it will vanish, more or
less quickly, over the next periods. Someone using a DS-model
would instead revise his forecast by one percent, thus taking
into account the random-walk character of real GNP . The diffe-
rence is described in Figure 1. After the unexpected jump of GNP
(in this case, the log of real GNP), the trend line now is on a
Figure 1: A Permanent Shift of the Level of a Time Series
In GNP
time
These two reactions described are extreme. It is, of course,
possible that the change of the forecast may lie between
zero and one, implying that part of the change is seen as
permanent. A way to estimate such decomposition between
permanent and transitory changes in time series is described
by Cochrane (1988).- 9 -
higher level (upper line) but still, of course, runs parallel to
the old one. This,- however, remains the path the economist be-
lieving in a TS-model will use for his forecast .
But if the random walk hypothesis is correct, can we still ob-
serve fluctuations which resemble the actual behavior of output?
To answer this question, we have run a simulation with a model
(for annual data) of the type
(3) yt = 0.043 + 1.0yt_1 + vfc
The values were chosen to match the actual development of real
GNP in West Germany, i.e., the average growth rate of real GNP
(equivalent to 4.3 percent ) between 1950 and 1987 and the vari-.
ance of v (which equals 0.00038). Drawing random values for v
and using equation (3) we get a simulated series for real GNP
which shows ups and downs over time which are similar to those of
the real-world series . That there are movements similar to cyc-
les can best be described in terms annual growth rates. Here, the
deviations from the long-term trend show persistence even though
the disturbances are random (Figure 2) .
If business cycles are only real, the consequences for economic
policy are drastic. If the observed movements of output merely
reflect market adjustments to unavoidable shocks (e.g., harvest
failures, economic developments in foreign countries), there is
no role for the government to counter these movements. The ups
and downs "... do not necessarily harm society, but simply re-
present the adjustments of markets to changes in tastes or con-
Or put differently, the TS-model implies a lower than ave-
rage growth rate for at least one period, thus allowing the
series to return to the trend line, whereas in the DS-case,
the expected growth rate is not changed.
This value is only a rough approximation because the trend
growth, as mentioned above, declined over time. However, the
simulation is used only for the purpose of demonstration.
Of course, the timing is different.- 10 -
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ditions of production... In the absence of externalities and
public goods... all fluctuations in aggregate output represent
this sort (= based on microeconomic theory, J.S.) of optimal
equilibrium" (Rush, 1987, p. 28) . All this implies that the ob-
ject of government policies - whether Keynesian or monetarist -
cannot be to reduce fluctuations or even to eliminate them. More
stability, then, does not mean more welfare.
While the logic of the theory is convincing, the question whether
business cycles are mostly (or even exclusively) real should be
settled by extensive empirical investigation. If v/e, for example,- 11 -
accept the conclusions reached by Nelson, Plosser (1982) and many
others, do we all believe in real business cycles now? Unfortuna-
tely, the issue cannot be settled easily because the empirical
tests are not conclusive, their power is not strong enough .
While many aspects of the tests seem to be in favor of the random
2
walk hypothesis , the crucial factor is that the true coefficient
of the lagged variable should be precisely one. If it is less
than one (even slightly so, e.g., 0.98), the result would not
invalidate the arguments of proponents of real business cycles,
but it would change the decomposition of a series into a perma-
nent . and transitory component significantly .
Other counter-arguments are concerned with the shocks to techno-
logy. Are they really big enough (and occur with high enough
frequency) to account for most or even all economic fluctuations?
Many authors have doubts concerning the procedure used by Kyd-
land, Prescott (1982), because they just choose the technological
shocks to match the behavior of economic variables: "..i if-some-
one believes that the variance of actual technology shocks is
only (say) one-tenth as large as the value implied by the Kyd-
land-Prescott model, he will find nothing in the Kydland-Prescott
results that would require him to alter his belief" (McCallum,
4
1986, p. 400). This criticism is widely accepted . What would be
necessary, then, is to define technological shocks more precise^-
ly, i.e., find variables whose changes would affect output in a
way that would be compatible with estimates of the parameters in
a production function.
Of course, the authors mention this fact.
2
For example, the values of the autocorrelation function in
Nelson, Plosser (1982) which are practically the same as for
a random walk model. However, as McCallum (1986, p. 405 f.)
points out, inspection of the autocorrelations alone cannot
be conclusive; the function is not unique but can also be-
long to classes of an ARMA-model which are trend stationary.
This point is extensively discussed by McCallum (1986, p.
405 ff.).
4
See, e.g., Dotsey, King (1988, p. 12).- 12 -
III. Tests on the Importance of the Random Walk Component
1. The TS - versus DS-model
It was mentioned before that standard regression results can be
misleading if the stochastic character of time series is not
correctly taken into account. If, for example, real GNP does
follow a random walk, the usual detrending - based on the assump-
tion of a deterministic trend - can lead to spurious interpreta-
tions. To demonstrate the difference, we estimated two regressi-
ons, one of the TS-class (4), one of the DS-class (5):
(4) yt = a± + o2t + a3t
2 + ufc
(5) yt = 3, + B2yt-1 + vfc
In the TS-model, we used a quadratic trend also to improve the
fit of (the log of) real GNP
1.
The estimates for the period 1952-1987 (annual data) are as
follows :




2 = 0.997 D.W. = 0.805
A linear trend makes no sense because the growth rates of
GNP declined over time. Therefore, in a regression with just
t we get negative residuals for the first years, positive
ones for the interim period, and negative residuals again
for the last couple of years.
_o
R is the adjusted correlation coefficient, D.W. the Durbin
Watson statistic. The t-values are given in parentheses;
they indicate that all estimated coefficients are highly
significant.Bibliotbek
des Institute fur Weirwirtschaft
- 13 -
(5
1) yt = 0.394 + 0.949yt_1 + 0
(7.40) (122.4)
R
2 = 0.998 D.W. = 1.796
Now, which model is better? Judging from the statistical criteria
of goodness of fit, they are equal. Also, all coefficients are
highly significant. However, the second model is preferable if we
consider the statistics on autocorrelation. While model (4
1)
reveals highly autocorrelated residuals (at lag one), the second
model (5
1) looks better in this respect. In general, this implies
at least, that the behavior of residuals has to be checked in the
diagnosis of regressions. And for certain hypotheses such as the
quantity theory it is better to use first differences rather than
detrended series .
See Section II, where this was mentioned. Two further re-
marks should be made: Firstly "highly correlated residu-
als ...(indicate)... strong persistence in the cyclical com-
ponent... these are exactly the characteristics one would
expect if the time series under investigation contain unit
roots" (Wasserfallen, 1988, p. 310) . This means that if a
series is truly a random walk, the detrended series is like-
ly to exhibit spurious periodicity (Stock, Watson, 1988, p.
168). Secondly, detrending can lead to misleading results
because the variable under investigation and the time trend
are not cointegrated. Cointegration means that the investi-
gated stochastic time series have the same trend. Real GNP
and the time trend, as in this example, are not cointegrated
by definition, because the time trend is not itself an inte-
grated stochastic process (Stock, Watson, 1988, p. 168) .- 14 -
2. Random Walks in Macroeconomic Series
We now turn to our investigation of macroeconomic time series in
West Germany. Many statistical procedures can be found in the
literature; we confine ourselves to very simple tests with annual
data. Unfortunately, the time series available are not as long as
for the United States since most series for West Germany start
only in 1950. This will perhaps limit the power of the tests. The
variables used are 17 nominal and real variables with the stan-
2
dard definitions . The first test concerns the random-walk hypo-
thesis in its simplest form:
(6) yt = a + 3yt_1 + ufc
We used natural logs for all the variables. What we want to test
is whether 3 = 1. The second procedure is to test a joint hypo-
thesis according to the equation:







Our null-hypothesis is, again, that 3=1. Furthermore, we test
whether y and 6 are zero, i.e., whether there is any influence of
further variables on the development of y or whether there is
still a trend (time trend = t).
The test results are reported in Tables la and lb. We can see
that almost all coefficients for the lagged variable are close to
one. The exceptions in Table la are employment and velocity, in
Table lb the number of variables with coefficients below 0.9 is
11 out of 17. If we apply the usual procedure of allowing two
Nelson, Plosser (1982), for example, can use up to 111 ob-
servations.
It should be noted, however, that we did consider the struc-
tural break in 1960 (inclusion of the Saarland and West
Berlin) in all the series. Furthermore, we made the adjust-
ments for the money supply Ml which are necessary in the
light of various statistical and institutional changes.- 15 -
standard errors, the value of 1.0 is included in five cases
(Table la) and eight cases (Table lb) , respectively. However,
this interpretation based on the normal distribution is not quite
correct, because it has been shown that in regressions like these
the estimates for the coefficients B are biased downwards. For
example, as Nelson and Plosser show in an example of simulated
random walks, estimates for 8 are about 0.9. A special statisti-
cal table has been developed for these hypotheses by Fuller
(1976) and others. For example, Wasserfallen (1988, p. 309 f.)
gets coefficients even much lower than most of the ones reported
in Table la and lb and concludes - on the basis of these tables -
that he cannot reject the hypothesis of a coefficient of one.
Using the table in Fuller (1976) , we are not able to reject the
hypothesis of a coefficient of one in eight cases (Table la) and
16 cases (Table lb), respectively.
However, there are some caveats to be made. Firstly, the estima-
ted slope coefficients are sometimes quite high even if we allow
for two standard errors. Ideally, they should represent the drift
part of the random walk. Secondly, as Table lb reveals, the null
hypothesis concerning y and 6 must be rejected in several cases
(although both these results can also be modified since there may
be a bias which is not in favor of the tested hypothesis). Final-
ly, in many regressions there is still autocorrelation left in
the residuals. This implies that we may not yet have found the
appropriate model.
All these factors indicate that other classes of models may also
be appropriate, and among them are even those which are, in ef-
fect, trend-stationary. For no matter how good a model is, it
must be kept in mind that it is not possible to distinguish con-
clusively between models with contain a coefficient of one or,
2
say, 0.96 for the autoregressive part . This is certainly not
1 Nelson, Plosser (1982, p. 144 ff.).
2
See Section II.- 16 -
Table la) - Regression Results - Test for Random Walk, 1953-1987
(annual data)


























































































































All variables are natural logs. Standard errors in parantheses.
*: The null-hypothesis that the coefficient equals one cannot be
rejected at the 5%-level (based on the test in Fuller, 1976) .
aThe significance level for the rejection of the hypothesis of
white noise in the residuals (according to the estimates of the
Q-statistic with 15 autocorrelations).- 17 -
Table lb) - Regressions Results - Test for Random Walk, 1953-1987
(annual data)


































































































































































































satisfactory because everybody can interpret the results the way
he likes . What we can say, however, on the basis of these re-
sults is that the permanent component of the changes in trend is
probably high. This means that, for example, with a coefficient
slightly less than one (e.g. 0.96) it will take many years until,
after a real shock, the series returns to its trend.
3. An Example: Unemployment
Interestingly, the series which comes very close to a random walk
is the unemployment rate since the coefficient is not signifi-
cantly different from one even if the t-statistic is applied;
also, all other test statistics are satisfactory. This is also
confirmed in a regression in which the coefficient of the lagged
endogenous variable is restricted to one. Our result differs from
the one in Nelson, Plosser (1982) about the United States where
the unemployment rate is the only series which does not seem to
follow a random walk. In the case of West Germany, the random
walk character seems obvious from Figure 3, because the rate does
not follow a pronounced cyclical pattern but instead shows shifts
which are persistent. This is particularly true for the 1970 's
and early 1980's when unemployment increased to a new level and
stayed there. This was the time of substantial real shocks, es-
pecially the oil price increases. These developments are a clear
indication that the economist still has to explain real world
phenomena even if the stochastic properties of a time series are
2
as in this case . Of course, there are several explanations for
the shifts in the unemployment rate, e.g., the hysteresis hypo-
thesis. However, as one example shows it is not necessary to give
That is, a proponent of real business cycle theory would see
them as another bit of evidence in his favor while others
would not need to change their minds.
Equivalently, economists use theories to explain exchange
rates or other prices on financial markets even though it is
widely held that these prices follow a random walk.- 19 -
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up neoclassical principles when these developments are explai-
ned .
Anyway, it is worth analyzing the aspect of real business cycle
theory a little further by looking at the importance of real
disturbances for economic activity. This is what we turn to next.
See Soltwedel, Trapp (1988), who consider these shifts as
reflecting changes in the natural rate of unemployment.- 20 -
IV. Real and Monetary Causes for Business Cycles
The question whether monetary policy can have any influence on
economic fluctuations has been answered to the negative in the
works on real business cycle theory. In part, these arguments are
based on empirical tests with vector autoregressions in which,
under certain circumstances, money fails to cause changes in
output. We want to investigate whether such conclusions hold up
for West Germany. In particular, we want to analyze the effects
of both monetary policy and real variables on the development of
output to see which group performs better or whether both are
important. By "performing" we simply mean whether Granger-cau-
sality is present .
1. The Data and the Method of Investigation
The variable to be explained is real domestic demand . This mea-
sure is preferred over real GNP because of the relatively large
external sector in West Germany; as has been shown in various
studies, the causal link between, e.g., monetary policy and do-
mestic demand is closer than that between money and GNP . After
all, we also want to look at the possible impact of external
influences (e.g., exports), so it does not make so much sense to
use GNP which includes exports.
Quarterly data are available from 1960 onwards. Given real do-
mestic demand as the variable to be explained, the role of six
candidates for explaining cycles is investigated. As far as mone-
tary factors are concerned, the influence of the real money supp-
ly Ml is tested. We also analyze the role of real interest ra-
See, for example, the discussion in Granger (1980) .
2
Real GNP minus real net exports.
See, for example, Scheide (1984).- 21 -
tes . The real variables are those which are commonly mentioned
when business cycle movements are explained. Not all of them are
supply side shocks or "shocks to technology" as mentioned in the
real business cycle theory, but they nevertheless reflect influ-
ences from the real side. The variables under investigation are:.
terms of trade, real exports, real government expenditures, and
2
real wages . Therefore, we can test the importance of
the oil price shocks, which led to a sharp decline of the
terms of trade in the 1970's and a strong increase in the
1980's;
the economic performance in other countries, which is, at
least to a large extent, exogenous to the West German eco-
nomy;
- . government activity , which, supposedly, played a major role
for the economic performance especially in the late 1960's
and in the 1970's; and
the behavior of labor unions, which has been called aggres-
sive in the 1970's and thus is held to have had an impact on
The money supply Ml is deflated with the price index of
nominal domestic demand; the real interest rate is approxi-
mated by the current nominal rate (3-months-money market
rate) minus the percentage change of the deflator over the
previous year.
The terms of trade are defined as the ratio between the
export and import deflator (NIA-basis). We further weighted
this measure in order to take account of the growing impor-
tance of the external sector; this means, since the sum of
exports and imports has grown over time relative to GNP, a
one percent change of the terms of trade is more important
in, say, 1985 than it was in 1965. Real exports are taken
from the NIA. Real government expenditures are outlays of
total government divided by the GNP-deflator. Real wages are
wages and salaries according to NIA, also divided by the
GNP-deflator.
The measure of expenditures is - as far as the impact on
output is concerned - less disputed than taxes or budget
deficits. See Barro (1987).- 22 -
economic activity .
In the tests, only real variables are used. Although it is true
that vector autoregressions can be viewed as reduced forms of,
possibly, a variety of structural models, they are not immune to
the Lucas-critique. In using the real money supply and real in-
terest rates, we come relatively close to shocks of monetary
policy.
In order to achieve stationarity of the series, we transformed
2
the data by taking the seasonal differences of the logs (except
for the interest rate). Since some of the original series exhibit
a quadratic trend, we also used a linear trend for the growth
rates.
To test for Granger-causality, we will use the procedure which
has been proposed by several authors and which is, for the case
of West Germany, applied by Scheide (1984) . This means that the
lag length in the vector autoregressions will be chosen according
to Akaike's FPE-criterion (final prediction error) which can be
preferred over the usual practice of ad-hoc lags . The search
procedure for the minimum FPE in a system of equations can be
described as follows:
1. We will first run univariate autoregressions for a,variable
y and choose the lag length according to the minimum FPE
(optimum is Nl).
Wage increases were very high then, a fact which is often
said to have contributed to the end of the Brandt-govern-
ment.
Differencing is done also in the light of the criticism with
respect to detrending (see Section II).
It is common practice to set the lag length ad hoc; usually,
lags of 4, 6, or 8 quarters are used. The results, however,
can be biased: existing causality may not be detected, or
there may be a spurious causality. For examples of the de-
fects, see Scheide (1984, p. 79 ff.).- 23 -
2. We will then add the second variable x testing all lags.
Causality runs from x to y if for any number of lags the FPE
is smaller than in the univariate case for y with lag length
Nl; the optimal system is y,x (Nl, N2).
3. Steps 1 and 2 will be taken to test for reversed causality,
i.e., whether y causes x.
4. A third variable z will be added to the optimal system of y
and x to see whether z causes y, or, in the other case,
causes x.
This procedure is a shortcut for testing all possible lag
1 2
lengths , but it seems fairly powerful .
The FPE is defined as follows:
(8) FPE = 1/T • (T+q)/(T-q) • SSR
where T is the number of observations, q is the number of estima-
ted coefficients, and the sum of squared residuals is SSR. In
other words, the reduction of the SSR in the regression has to be
sufficiently large to outweigh the "penalty" of an increase in q
by the addition of another lag.
The tests will be performed for the period 1964:1 to 1987:4 ,
i.e., there are 96 observations for each equation. The univariate
autoregression will be run for the variable y (seasonal differen-
ce of the log) according to:
N
(9) y = c + bt + I a.• y . + u ; N = 1,2,...,8.
t i=1 l t-i t
As an example, in a system of three variables, 512 equations
would have to be estimated if we test up to 8 lags.
For examples supporting this view, see Hsiao (1981) and
Scheide (1984).
This allows us to check relatively long lags.- 24 -
where c is a constant and t takes account of the fact that a
trend is present in the some of the variables. Lags up to eight
quarters will be tested. With the optimal lag length being Nl, we
will then test whether x causes y:
Nl N




 x j = i 3
 t-3 t
Causality is present if the minimum of the FPE for any of the
equations (10) will be lower than the minimum in the univariate
case (9). Reversed causality (does y cause x?) and the influence
of other variables (e.g., does z cause x or y?) will be tested
accordingly.
2. What Causes Output?
As a first step, we analyze the impact of the variables mentioned
on real domestic demand - and vice versa - in the bivariate sys-
tem (Table 2a and 2b) . Given the optimal lag in the univariate
regression for real domestic demand (with lag 4), the six variab-
les mentioned were each added to this equation. It turns out that
our output measure is caused by real Ml, real interest rate,
terms of trade and - with the smallest reduction of the FPE -
real exports. For the latter, however, the sum of the coeffici-
ents is negative which seems implausible . The other results are
roughly in line with previous studies on West Germany. Somewhat
surprisingly, though, no causal role can be attributed to real
government expenditures and real wages.
In the tests for causality in the opposite direction we find that
real domestic demand causes the real money supply, although the
reduction of the FPE is only minimal (Table 2b) . While there is
no impact on other variables, real domestic demand is causal with
One might expect a positive sign because a good export per-
formance is supposed to boost investment spending. However,
the result is not a variance with other investigations; for
example, it appears also in Scheide (1987, p. 39) , where a
different method is used.- 25 -


























Given the optimal lag length of 4 for the univariate regression
of real domestic demand. The FPE is 0.304 x 10
Multiplied by 10
3.
The significance level for the rejection of the null hypothesis
of white-noise residuals (based on the estimates of the Q-sta-
tistic with 27 autocorrelations).- 26 -
Table 2b) - Causality Tests for Six Variables and Real Domestic
Demand
Variable Optimal lag Optimal lag
length length for













































1FPE multiplied by 10
3,
2See Table 2a.- 27 -
respect to real wages (with a positive sign). This result is
compatible with the hypothesis of a procyclical behavior of real
wages . In all equations, the tests for autocorrelation in the
residuals (calculated from the Q-statistic) are favorable, i.e.,
the hypothesis of white noise in the residuals cannot be rejec-
ted. This is, by the way, also the case for all the systems re-
ported in the following parts.
After this more or less preliminary search procedure we will
continue with a more detailed analysis in order to find out
whether monetary policy does have an effect on output even if
other hypotheses are tested or other variables included. For
this, we will use those variables which were found to have a
significant impact on real domestic demand, namely real Ml, the
real interest rate and the terms of trade.
3. Do Interest Rates Dominate the Money Supply as a Causal
.Factor?
An important contribution in the debate on real versus monetary
business cycle theory was the empirical study by Sims (1980) in
which it is shown that the explanatory power of the money supply
vanishes if the interest rate is included in the system of vector
2
autoregressions . While this is viewed by some as evidence
against monetarism - at least in its rational expectations ver-
sion .-, the result does in no way imply that actions of the cen-
tral bank have no_ impact on production. For this to be true "...
See, e.g., Scheide (1984, pp. 101 ff.), where the same re-
sult is obtained.
The result for the United States is based on the estimates
on the decomposition of variance of the variables under
consideration. In Sims' paper, the contribution of innova-
tions in the money stock is substantially reduced (from 37
to 4 percent in the postwar period) if the interest rate is
added to the system. In other words, the money supply is not
Granger causal anymore in the extended system.- 28 -
it would have to be shown that neither money stock nor interest
rate innovations had appreciable explanatory power for output"
(McCallum, 1986, p. 401). Since the US-Fed, as well as many other
central banks including the Deutsche Bundesbank, pursued an in-
terest rate policy, actions of the monetary authority may show up
in the interest rate in addition or instead of the money supply.
Starting from our results for the bivariate systems where both
the real money supply and the real interest rate are causal for
real domestic demand, we now test whether one of the two variab-
les of monetary policy dominates the other. Given the optimal lag
structure (see Table 2a) for domestic demand/money supply (4,1)
and domestic demand/interest rate (4,1) we add the respective
third variable, again testing all lags up to eight quarters
(Table 3a). It turns out that in the first case the interest rate
does not improve the result in the output/money-system; the FPE
does not decline, the interest rate is no longer causal. For the
second case, we can say that the money supply is again causal,
and, as the optimal three-variable system happens to be the
same , the impact of the interest rate disappears. Since we can
2
assume to have found the optimal system we can conclude that, if
anything, the causal role of the money supply for output is stron
1
ger than that of the interest rate.
To complete the test, we also have to investigate all other pos-
sible directions of causality. For the bivariate case of the
money supply and the interest rate, it turns out that the inter-
est rate causes money; in fact, according to the reduction of the
FPE, the influence is very strong, and the sign is, as to be
expected, negative (Table 3b). There is no causality in the oppo-
site direction. When domestic demand is added to both optimal
-The lags are (4,1,1) for the system of three variables in
both cases, so the equations are identical.
Of the possible 512 equations in the three-variable system
with up to eight lags.- 29 -
Table 3a) - Causality Tests for Real Domestic Demand, Real Money Supply and
Real Interest Rates
2
Bivariate „ Added variable FPE of Significance -. Causality





















Optimal system according to Table 2a.- ' See Table 2a.
Table 3b - Causality Tests for Real Money Supply and Real Interest Rates
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Optimal lag for univariate case. See Table 2b.- ' See Table 2a.
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Optimal system according to Table 3b.- ' See Table 2a.- 30 -
bivariate systems, no additional explanatory power can be detec-
ted, domestic demand is not causal for either the money supply or
the interest rate (Table 3c) .
While the latter result is not surprising in the light of our
previous findings (especially Table 2b), the causality structures
found in Tables 3a and 3b need interpretation. First of all, it
cannot be said that money plays no role in explaining output
2
movements. Even if the significance of money vanished as the
interest rate is added to the system, we could not conclude that
monetary policy has no effect. It is true, according to neoclas-
sical theory, that real interest rates do react after a real
disturbance ; however, they do not only reflect changes in the
real economy but also actions of the central bank. Although the
results concerning the link between the real interest rate and
4
the real money supply are surprising and will need further empi-
rical study, we can also say that actions of the central bank,
via changes in interest rates or in the money supply, obviously
affect output. This result contradicts the notion that money does
not matter.
4. The Role of Real and Monetary Factors for Output
In Section IV.2 we found that both the real money supply and the
terms of trade were causal for real domestic demand if a two-va-
riable system is considered. We now test the joint hypothesis by
adding a third variable to the optimal two-variable system. If
the influence of the terms of trade variable is analyzed, we find
We get the same results as in Table 3c if we change the
order of the added variables, i.e., if we add the money
supply to the interest rate/domestic demand system and the
interest rate to the money supply/domestic demand system.
2
Table 3a says it does not.
See Barro (1987) for several examples.
One would expect causality also in the other direction,
i.e., money to cause interest rates.- 31 -
that this relative price does not improve the system of domestic
demand/money supply (Table 4a), i.e., it is not causal in the
three-variable system. This means that the effects of the money
supply dominate, which is also revealed by the second result:
real Ml is causal for domestic demand in the three-variable
system . It seems, therefore, that even when real shocks are
considered, the impulses from the money supply variable (real Ml)
are more important.
Turning to the analysis of causality in the opposite direction,
we find causality running from the terms of trade to the money
supply but not vice versa (Table 4b). While the latter result may
be surprising, the former shows that there may either be a reac-
tion of the central bank after a change in the terms of trade
(e.g., more monetary expansion in the case of a revaluation of
the D-Mark, which is in accordance with casual observations) or.
that a terms of trade improvement raises real Ml simply by re-
ducing the price level.
If real domestic demand is included, there is hardly any
 ;change
in these results; it is - as before - only slightly causal with
respect to real Ml and not causal for the terms of trade.
To sum up, the results of this section are in favor of the view
of monetary business cycles, because the money supply shows a
strong causal link with output. Interest rates and terms of trade
are, by themselves, also important; their relevance, however, is
sharply reduced or even vanishes if the money supply is taken
into account.
We left out the real interest rate in this analysis. Similar
tests, however, were also run for the three-variable system
including domestic demand, interest rate and terms of trade.
It turns out that in this case, both variables are causal
with respect to domestic demand.- 32 -
Table 4a) - Causality Tests for Real Domestic Demand, Real Money Supply and
Terms of Trade
2
Bivariate , 2 Added variable FPE Significance _ Causality
System (FPE ) (optimal Lag) for the level residual of added
added variable
variable (yes/no)
Domestic demand/ Terms of
money supply trade (2) 0.266 0.587 no
(0.264)
Domestic demand/ Money
terms of trade supply (1) 0.266 0.587 yes
(0.291)
1 2 3
Optimal system according to Table 2a.- ' See Table 2a.
Table 4b - Causality Tests for Real Money Supply and Terms of Trade
1 2
Variable (Lag ) Added variable FPE Significance 3 Causality
(optimal lag) level residual (yes/no)
Money supply(6) Terms of trade(1). 0.296 0.645 , yes
Terms of trade(7) Money supply(5) 0.0227 0.771 no
1 2 3
Optimal lag for univariate case. See Table 2b.- ' See Table 2a.
Table 4c - Causality Tests for Real Money Supply, Terms of Trade and Real
Domestic Demand
2 Bivariate Added variable FPE Significance _ Causality




terms of trade demand(5) 0.295 0.235 yes
(6,1)
Terms of trade/ Domestic •
money supply demand(1) 0.0232 0.772 no
(7,5)
1 "Optimal system according to Table 4b.- ' See Table 2a.- 33 -
V. Focus on the Seventies
The period of the 1970's can be characterized as a time with
substantial shocks to the West German economy. We could observe
sharp ups and downs of monetary expansion, oil price increases of
unprecedented magnitude, plus other changes which challenged the
adjustment capacity of the economy, in particular, the transition
to a system of flexible exchange rates.
We want to analyze whether the results reported in Section IV
have to be modified if we concentrate on the 1970's. It seems
appropriate to extend the estimation period somewhat in order to
have a sensible number of degrees of freedom; therefore, the
period' 1968 to 1983 will be analyzed (i.e. 64 observations) .
Furthermore, the method used is similar to the one in the pre-
vious section; however, we do not again go through the search
procedure of testing many of the possible lag lengths. For the
purpose at hand, it seems sufficient to test various vector au-
toregression systems with a fixed number of lags. Following con-
ventional procedures, we use four lags in all equations; in the
light of the lag lengths we found to be optimal in the previous
section, this choice does not seem to be extremely wrong. The
variables used are real domestic demand, real Ml, real interest
rates and terms of trade .
As a first step, we estimated vector autoregressions with two
variables. The results for the six systems are reported in Table
5;. the figures are the significance levels of the block of the
2 right-hand side ("explanatory") variables . It turns out that our
The other variables mentioned in Section IV. 2 were also
tested, but, as before, they were not causal for real do-
mestic demand.
A low level implies that the null hypothesis (= the coeffi-
cients of the explanatory variables are zero) can be rejec-
ted at a low significance level; conventional levels are
0.05 or 0.01. - In the tables, we do not report the signifi-
cance levels for the lagged values of the left-hand side
variable, which are extremely low in all cases. Also, the
results for the tests for autocorrelation of the residuals
are not reported; as before, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the residuals are white noise.- 34 -
Table 5) - Significance Level of Variables in a Two-Variable
Vector Autoregression System
' (Estimation Period 1968:1 to 1983:4)
Influence on
Influence of
Real domestic Real money Real interest Terms
demand supply rate of
trade
Real domestic
demand 0.4627 0.1806 0.2288
Real money
supply 0.0018 x 0.5480 0.3399
Real interest
rate 0.0129 0.0000 x 0.0236
Terms of
trade 0.0293 0.6254 0.6814 x
Significance levels of the block of the right-hand side variab-
les in the regressions are reported.- 35 -
previous results are more or less confirmed:
Real domestic demand is strongly influenced by all other
three variables, and the lowest significance level is again
found for real Ml. On the other hand, domestic demand is not
causal for any of the other variables; i.e., money supply,
interest rates and terms of trade are causally prior (or
exogenous) in the two variable system.
Real Ml is, again, strongly caused (=significance level
close to zero) by real interest rates; there is no causality
in the opposite direction. Also, the money supply does 'not
significantly affect the terms of trade.
The real interest rate is causal (at the standard signifi-
cance level of 0.05) for all other three variables but is
not influenced by any of them.
The terms of trade have a significant influence on domestic
demand only, and is itself caused by the interest rate.
As before, we are also interested in whether the results change
if three instead of two variables are analyzed in a system. The
four variables mentioned make up four possible systems of this
order; the results are reported in Tables 6a' to 6d. In the first
system (domestic demand, money supply, interest rate) we find
that real domestic demand is caused by real Ml and real interest
rates; however, the significance of the latter is strongly redu-
ced compared to the two-variable case (Table 6a) . The other re-
lationships are not changed in principle, the interest rate still
has a strong impact on the money supply. .
In the second system the variable "terms of trade" is included
instead of the interest rate (Table 6b) . The terms of trade,
however, do no longer significantly influence domestic demand;
only the money supply is causal. Both other variables have an
impact on the terms of trade.- 36 -















































See Table 5.- 37 -



















































In the third system, too, we get similar results as before; both
interest rates and terms of trade are causal for domestic demand
(Table 6c) . And also in the last system (money supply, interest
rates and terms of trade), the results concerning the causal
ordering are practically identical to what was found before.
Therefore, the results of the vector autoregressions in.this sec-
tion support the previous findings that monetary policy - or more
precisely: changes in the money supply - has a relatively strong
influence on output and that it seems to dominate other factors.
This is true even for the 19 70's when real shocks of unusual
magnitude hit the economy.- 39 -
tl the nonneutrality of money...
is surely the hardest problem
in macroeconomics".
Barro (1984, p. 179).
VI. Money Isn't Neutral After All
1. The Results in the Light of Other Studies
In the preceding three sections, the arguments of the real busi-
ness cycle theory were subjected to empirical tests. We used
random walk tests and vector autoregressions in order to account
for the different evidence usually put forward by those who
stress the dominance of real factors for fluctuations of economic
activity. As expected, the results are not conclusive. The hypo-
thesis that macroeconomic time series follow a random walk found
some support, at least, it could not be rejected with much power.
However, the results in the vector autoregression analysis sug-
gest that monetary policy still plays a major role for explaining
output movements.
 ;
The money supply was strongly causal with respect to .domestic
demand,: and it dominates the other variables (interest rates,
terms of trade). The role of interest rates is
rinteresting since
they are a causal prior for the money supply. At least in part,
this, can be attributed to the way monetary policy has been pur-
sued in West Germany. During most of the time of the estimation
period, the Deutsche Bundesbank used interest rates as the in-:
strument for monetary policy; therefore, the response of the
money supply is not surprising. Real interest rates also react
after a real shocks. But in the vector autoregressions, we could
not make out any influence from that side. Certainly, more work
on these relationships is necessary.
In. the light of other studies on West Germany, these results
concerning the strong effects of monetary policy are not surpri-
sing . After all, the seven business cycles of the postwar
See, for example, Trapp (1976) and Scheide (1984).- 40 -
period - beginning in 1950 - were closely connected with changes
in monetary policy. Without oversimplification it can be said
that there was no recession without a marked deceleration of
monetary expansion, and no boom without rapid monetary expansion.
While the strong view that money plays no role can thus not be
supported by empirical analysis, the real business cycle theory
cannot be dismissed in principle. Not only do the random walk
tests suggest a substantial weight of the permanent component;
but also the behavior of the trend of output suggests that in the
case of West Germany, too, a great part of the fluctuations in
economic activity must be attributed to real changes. Real shocks
were important in those phases when the growth rate declined
markedly, in particular after the oil price hikes of the 1970's.
2. Growth Theory and Business Cycle Theory Are One
In general, then, it does not seem appropriate to rely exclusive-
ly on real or monetary variables when explaining economic actiyi-
2
ty . It is, therefore, also not appropriate to make a distinction
between growth theory and business cycle theory . What needs to
be done, then, is to incorporate monetary factors into a theore-
tical model, possibly of the Kydland/Prescott type in order to
overcome the present state of neoclassical business cycle theory
which can be characterized as: "... there is currently no compel-
ling evidence for any particular description of cycles..." (Dot-
4
sey, King, 1988, p. 12) .
One can leave out the period before 1950 that was characte-
rized by the reconstruction.
For an empirical, study on the decomposition of trend and
cyclical developments, see Cochrane (1988) .
This is also the tendency in the work of Lucas.
On these problems, see also the book of Lucas (1987) on the
frontiers of business cycle theory.- 41 -
The policy implications of the neoclassical real business cycle
theory are radical for stabilization policies derived from the
Keynesian paradigm ; this, however, is not surprising or new.
However^ since the view that monetary policy plays no role could
not be validated, the idea of monetarist prescriptions cannot be
dismissed.. In particular, a rule for monetary policy would help
to stabilize the development of output ; this is disputed by real
business cycle theory. No doubt, it cannot be a sensible target
(definitively no a feasible one anyhow) of economic policy to
eliminate all fluctuations. But how much such rules for monetary
and .also fiscal policy would help has recently been subject to
controversy. Lucas (1987) comes up with a surprisingly low esti-
mate of the variability of consumption that could possibly be
reduced by the most stable policies . This implies that the wel-
fare losses even from "bad" stabilization policies are minor. It
is true that most negative effects from cyclical fluctuations in
the postwar period are dwarfed in the light of substantial chan-
4
ges in underlying growth rates we can observe in some countries .
However, the order of -magnitude mentioned above seems to be ex-
tremely low if the substantial misallocations induced by monetary
instability are considered .
See Section II.
o- ••••'.. • . • ' '
For a simple example of a rule for West Germany, see Scheide
(1988a). -
-For the postwar period in the United States Lucas' calcula-
ted: "Eliminating aggregate consumption variability .....
would ... be equivalent in utility terms of an increase in
:avarage consumption of something less than one tenth of a
percentage point ..." (Lucas, 1987, p. 26/27).
4 See Lucas (1988) .
For example, think of the investments that were taken solely
for the purpose of hedging against inflation. For a discus-
sion, see also Scheide (1988b).- 42 -
3. Some Problems With Real Business Cycle Theory
Many reservations have been made with respect to real business
cycle theory . One concerns the timing of some variables in re-
lation to output movements. For example, a favorable supply shock
should raise the profitability of, investment (Brunner,. Meltzer,
1986, p. 4). Therefore, one would expect investment activity to
accelerate early in the cycle. This, however, is not a regularity
of business cycles. . , .
Furthermore, we can very often observe changes in real variables'
which are closely related to changes in monetary policy. The
large ups and downs of (real) exchange rates are one example. -It
would be hard to explain, say, the sharp trend changes of the
US-dollar solely as a response to real shocks.- Instead, these
changes coincided with changes in the course (or regime) of mone-
tary policy.
It is true, supply shocks have at times be substantial. The. oil
price . increases of the seventies and. the decline since late 1985
implied large changes in the "oil bill", adding up to some one-.to
two percent of GNP in the case of West Germany. But we experien-
ced much sharper downturns of economic activity in 1974/75 and
1980/82 so there must have been an extremely large "multiplier".
And above all, real shocks of this magnitude could not be obser-
ved in earlier periods. For example, in the course of the reces-
sion of 1966/67, such real shocks were not present at all, al-
though that recession was about as severe as the downturns in
1974/75 and 1980/82. So it seems that it is difficult to make out
real shocks of the. magnitude and frequency which would be suffi-
cient to exclusively account for all economic fluctuations.
If proponents of real business cycle theory see a connection
2
between output and money, it is. one of reversed causality. . The
empirical tests in this paper could not at all support this view.
1 See, for example, McCallum (1986) and Brunner, Meltzer
(1986) .
2
On this point, see, again, McCallum (1986, p. 398).- 43 -
Furthermore, other studies on West Germany • show that money (at
least, the aggregate Ml) runs ahead of output movements by seve-
ral quarters .While it may be true that this does not necessari-
ly mean a causality running from money to output, the reversed-
causality argument would have to rely on a case of "ante hoc ergo
propter hoc".
4. Some Doubts on the Long-run Neutrality of Money
Most models of monetary business cycle theory are based on the
natural rate theory and the long-run neutrality of money. While
this is certainly a sensible axiom for abstract models, we should'
ask whether these tenets also hold in the light of other theore-
tical (and empirical) considerations. If we want to describe the
long-run neutrality strictly, we would come up with a definition
like: In the long run, say, twenty years from now, the level of
real output will be the same no matter how monetary policy be-
2
haves in the meantime . Such a definition can be questioned on
various grounds. And we do not have to rely on pre-monetarist
theories .
One is the (now almost popular) notion of Friedman on the posi-
tively sloped Phillips-curve (Friedman, 1977).. The second con-
cerns the possible effects of monetary instability on economic
growth. Since uncertainty about the future course of monetary
policy raises the risk premium in interest rates (and thereby the
observed real interest rate), investment may be dampened (Masca-
ro, Meltzer, 1983) . Monetary instability was found to have a
1 Trapp (1976) and Scheide (1987) .
If this was true, the gains from rules for monetary (and
fiscal) policy might be small indeed. ... .
Certainly, Austrians would not subscribe to such a descrip-
tion of neutrality. . •- 44 -
negative impact on growth in many industrial countries (Kormendi,
Meguire, 1985) . A basic microeconomic contribution explaining
these phenomena was > the demonstration how inflation can weaken
the signalling function and thereby the allocative efficiency of
the price system (Cukierman, 1982).
All these factors suggest that money is not neutral even in the
long run; the way policy is pursued, the level and variability of
inflation can also have permanent effects on the level of output.
Admittedly, this does not make the decomposition of economic
fluctuations into permanent and cyclical components easier. But
it is nevertheless suggestive for a comprehensive theory .of',
growth and business cycles.
The instability and rapid inflation in many developing coun-
tries is, one can imagine, also detrimental to growth in
these countries.- 45 -
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